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where (Gergen 1988), however, there is no way to distinguish
among psychological mechanisms, processes, or the like, save
through a theoretical a priori. Once initial agreements are secured
concerning the mind and how it is manifest, theories can be
compared; however, these agreements are in no way derived from
observation of the events themselves. In effect, the mind may be
viewed as a conversational object, and in the case of self-
deception, a social construction of the professional psychologist
(see also Gergen 1994).
Interpretation as politics by other means. Although Mele is
clear enough about the role of theory as an explanatory device,
there is otherwise an unfortunate tendency throughout the target
article to reify the conceptual apparatus. Continuing a longstand-
ing tradition in cognitive psychology, Mele comes to use terms
such as self-deception, motivation, and the like as descriptions or
stand-ins for the real. The very title of the piece, Real self-
deception, is emblematic. Given the incapacity of theoretical
language to picture or map the real, or to be linked ostensibly to
particulars of the mind, how are we to respond to this invasive
rhetoric of reality? At least one useful redoubt is to consider its
cultural consequences. That is, the professional language of psy-
chology is an entry into cultural life, and as this language is
absorbed within its institutions and its daily relationships, we may
be concerned with its consequences ± ethical, ideological, and
political. Here it is particularly worth noting that Mele's rendering
of self-deception operates pragmatically in a highly similar way to
the traditional account. That is, the term self-deception has
traditionally operated as a performative, infirming and disqualify-
ing the subject's avowals (see Gergen 1985). Although Mele
attempts to redraw the conception, the pragmatic implications
remain robust. In addition, this particular account thrusts the
scientist (in this case the professional psychologist) into the role of
arbiter on matters of self-deception. It is through scientific prac-
tice, we are subtly informed, that we rid ourselves of cognitive bias,
and scientists themselves are positioned so as to rule on such
matters. I worry about the unwarranted, unquestioned, and ulti-
mately self-serving implications of the analysis.
There are alternatives. Many psychologists now seek means of
theorizing the person in more relational terms (see Gergen 1994).
That is, rather than viewing the individual as the site of rationality,
motivation, and the like, the attempt is made to articulate the
interpersonal matrix from which the human qualities of rationality,
memory, and so on derive. Lewis (1996) nicely demonstrates the
possibility of a relational analysis of self-deception, one that
simultaneously places it within the sphere of human connection,
and largely removes its pejorative implications. That seems a very
promising direction for future work.
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Abstract: A major worry in self-deception research has been the implica-
tion that people can hold a belief that something is true and false at the
same time: a logical as well as a psychological impossibility. However, if
beliefs are held with imperfect confidence, voluntary self-deception in the
sense of seeking evidence to reject an unpleasant belief becomes entirely
plausible and demonstrably real.
I agree entirely with the thrust of Mele's argument that there really
is no such thing as self-deception, and with his general arguments,
but I think another approach is equally effective in rejecting the
idea. First I assume that, if the phenomena usually regarded as
supporting the idea of self-deceiving behaviour can be accounted
for even where the person is aware of the conflict between the two
competing cognitions (e.g., being pro-Nazi and anti-Nazi, or
seeing oneself as clever and as stupid about the same topic or
problem), then people will have no problem with situations in
which people cannot, after the event, report that there ever was a
conflict: unconscious self-deception.
As I see it, the central puzzle Mele is attacking is whether
intentional self-deception is logically possible and/or actually
occurring. He quotes Gur and Sackeim (1979) as defining self-
deception in terms of simultaneously holding a belief and its
opposite (p and ,p). It is this defining criterion I do not accept.
Mele suggests in his caveat at the end of section 2 that he defies
ªbelieving pº as anything a person believes to a degree greater than
50%. Not-p (,p) is where the belief in p is less than 50%. Once we
refuse to accept this pair of definitions the whole problem disap-
pears. Partial belief simply states the common-sense idea that
doubt exists.
If X is strongly motivated to believe one thing, but has strong
doubts, that is, he believes it ,50% ± which is described by Mele
as actually believing the opposite ± he would be wise to look
specifically for evidence designed to change his mind, that is, to
increase his belief to .50%. It is very hard to think of any situation
in which there is no possible doubt whatever. The idea of uncer-
tainty may in fact be totally general. Indeed, most philosophers
warn us of the difficulty of even being absolutely sure that we have
a table in front of us (when we do have one, that is!), and though
they suggest that analytic statements are definitely true and so we
have no reason to doubt them, anyone who has tried to add up a
long column of figures or checked a computer program will know
that the surety of truth in purely analytic systems does not,
paradoxically, lead to any certainty that answers are correct.
The suggested ªsolutionº is best presented by examples of the
way doubts are suppressed and self-conversations adequately
accomplished in the belief patterns of whole categories of people
not just individuals. With the Inquisition on the alert, the sixteenth
century ex-Jew who found Christian doctrine rather muddled and
nonsensical, would be well motivated to find reasons to believe in
it anyway. Similarly, any German living in Hitler's Germany around
1937 would be well aware that any doubts about Nazism that he
previously held were safer being dismissed. In each case the
person would be actively seeking to deceive in himself according
to the definition Mele is using, but neither would be faced with any
major logical problem. Each would be in a situation in which one
says:
I tend to believe this. It is dangerous to do so and I want to believe the
opposite. I could be wrong. I hope I am wrong. Let me see if I cannot
persuade myself that I am in fact wrong. Thank goodness, I have done it!
I have changed my mind. Now let's make sure I do not have people or
ideas coming along and persuading me I was right the first time. I will
avoid the possibility by not listening to any arguments and avoiding
people who believe what I used to believe. Or I could bravely persuade
others of the rightness of my new views. If I can do that, I must have
been right to change my mind or these converts would not be convert-
ible, and I must admit sometimes I still have small doubts and need
social support.
This idea of reinforcement of one's own faith by what amounts to
missionary activity, predicts the keenness and fanaticism of the
convert, and I have stolen it straight from Festinger et al. (1964).
In the attempt to persuade oneself, one could be expected to
use every technique used when attempting to convert someone
else if motivation were sufficiently great. We can assume that
usually the motivation in self-deception is not so intense or at least
not so clearly in one's best interests as in the chosen examples of
the Gestapo and the Inquisition, in which case the persuasion
effort might be less concentrated, but might nonetheless be very
effective.
I believe the evidence suggests that the most common motive
served by self-deception is self-esteem enhancement and protec-
tion, so perhaps it is not surprising that people do end up with
views of themselves similar to those described in the quotation of
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Gilovich (1991) in section 3. Since the reviews by Jones (1973) and
by Schrauger (1975) we have been well aware that people tend to
accept information that flatters them provided there is little
chance of having to come to terms with nasty reality. This certainly
suggests a deliberate attempt to self-deceive, within Mele's defini-
tion, and to provide a more pleasant world view in which Self is
better than expected, by seeking out and more readily accepting
supporting evidence.
As indicated in Mele's various scenarios self-deception is often
far from simple, but nothing in them seems to lead to important
difficulties in handling the logical problems of self-deception.
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Abstract: A form of self-deception exists that is both intentional and
common. In it, people act as if they are undergoing a certain state of mind
as a tactic for experiencing the state. This kind of self-deception can be
illustrated by what happens to players of simulation games. Someone
playing a pilot in a flight simulator game, for example, comes to experience
aspects of the world of a pilot. Research on hypnotic responding is used to
illustrate the nature and effectiveness of such a strategy of self-deception.
A form of self-deception exists that is both garden variety and
more intentional than the type discussed by Professor Mele in the
target article. I refer here to cases in which the person, in seeking
to believe that a certain state (e.g., caring, anger, optimism) exists
in the self, acts as if the state is occurring. In these cases, the
person's knowledge that the state will not occur drives the fabrica-
tion of behavioral evidence designed to support the existence of
the state. The (fabricated) evidence, in turn, helps convince the
actor that the state is present. A good deal of theorizing in social
psychology assumes that this intentional process of self-deception
occurs in everyday life and is successful (e.g., Taylor 1989).
A look at what transpires with players of simulation games can
help explain how intentional self-deception works (Gorassini, in
press a). During play in a flight simulator ± a sophisticated training
and game technology ± events can be organized perceptually by
the player around one of two themes. One organizing framework is
the reality defined by the game, in which the person is a pilot, the
immediate surround is a cockpit, and the world beyond the plane's
exterior is the sky. The other mode of organization consists of the
reality defined by the situation that encompasses the game, in
which the person is a player (not a pilot), the immediate environ-
ment is a fake cockpit (not a real one), and the area housing game
apparatus is an arcade (not the sky). Human beings can control
how they organize environmental input in simulator situations,
much as they organize the stimulus input in so-called reversible
figures (found in the perception chapters of introductory psychol-
ogy texts). Events can be experienced in the game-defined way or
experienced from the perspective encompassing the game. For
extended periods, a player can get into the game and remain
largely unaware that the game-defined theme is invalid. Self-
deception in this model, then, is the perceptual shift from reality
outside the game to reality inside the game followed by the
extended use of game reality to define tasks to be performed.
The nature of the situation that the actor observes during a self-
deception attempt is pivotal to the success of self-deception. If the
flight simulator mimics well the sights, sounds, movements, and
demands experienced in an actual aircraft cockpit, then self-
deception has a much better chance of taking hold than if the
simulator provides a poor representation on these stimuli. Several
sources of realism exist in the simulator, including the appearance
and actions of the principal actor, any supporting actors, and the
nonhuman environment. This means that the player in the flight
simulator must contribute to realism by assuming the role of a
pilot. Failing to do so would make experiencing the world of a pilot
flying an airplane impossible. If, all told, the information available
to the actor provides a good counterfeit of game-defined reality,
then self-deception becomes a relatively easy task.
In deceiving themselves, then, players carry out two kinds of
intentional act, neither of which the Mele model of self-deception
takes into account. The first is acting the role assigned by the game
± caring person, competent person, or pilot. The second consists
of construing events from the perspective defined by the game.
The actor is spared the full burden of self-deception. A realistic
game situation serves to help fool the self into believing that events
are as they appear.
Research on hypnotic responding underscores the effectiveness
of this process of self-deception. A response is hypnotic if it
appears to occur involuntarily when suggested by the hypnotist.
Research reveals interesting associated phenomena that suggest
hypnotic responding is actually the product of an intentional self-
deception process in which the person attempts to create the
experiences, including involuntariness, that are thought to occur
in hypnosis:
(1) Those who exhibit responses to hypnotic suggestions also
frequently avow intentionally having made the response in an
effort to experience hypnosis (Gorassini, in press b). This kind of
report is suspiciously similar to the kind a game player would
provide when describing what happened in a simulation game: ªI
acted like a pilot so I would feel like I was flying an airplane.º
(2) Techniques designed to get research participants to inter-
pret hypnosis as a game result in a substantial increase in the rate
at which hypnotic responses are exhibited (Gorassini & Spanos
1986). This is even true of participants who previously scored low
in responsiveness to suggestions. Because just about everyone
possesses the ability to play simulation games and experience
events as real within the game context, just about everyone can
play the hypnosis game and feel, as a consequence, as if responses
to suggestions are occurring involuntarily.
(3) Hypnotic responding and hypnosis-related experiencing
occur most in situations made to appear prototypically hypnotic
(Spanos 1986). When, for example, messages designed to elicit
hypnotic responses imply the responses will be involuntary (e.g.,
ªyour arm is risingº), hypnotic responses, including experiences of
nonvolition, occur more frequently than when the eliciting mes-
sages imply the responses will be cases of mudane obedience (e.g.,
ªlift your armº) (Spanos & Gorassini 1984).
Using techniques such as role-playing, construal of events in
terms of game reality, and the selection of situations known to
support desired self-views, the actor intentionally self-deceives.
Such a process is implied in social psychological theorizing in
which it is believed commonplace for human beings to act their
way into unwarranted beliefs about such things as their worth
relative to others, their control over the environment, and the
brightness of their future prospects (e.g., Swann 1987; Taylor
1989).
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Abstract: Mele's modified definition of self-deception is consistent with
evolutionary theory. Self-deception is most likely whenever ignorance
confers (reproductive) advantage, namely, in impression management,
deception, conformity, social norms, reproductive knowledge, and existen-
tial conflicts. Second-order self-deception (unawareness of unawareness)
perpetuates self-deception and may be the reason for our misguided
definitions.
